Enemy of the State No. 1. Repressions against Russian Anarchists

Editorial note: 

This article provides valuable insight into the ongoing repression of anarchists in Russia and the resilience of the Russian anarchist movement, which is frequently at the forefront of direct action. We join the author’s call to support Russian anarchists, especially those who are currently imprisoned. At the same time, we want to note that, in addition to cases mentioned in the article, there are also parts of the Russian anarchist movement that engage in such activities as independent education and creating alternative infrastructures. There is no single form of anarchism; rather, there are many anarchisms. Meanwhile, the state portrays anarchism as a “radical” and “dangerous” ideology, linking it exclusively to violence.

Anarchists have long been among the most uncompromising and consistent opponents of state power. They refuse to integrate into the system and place no faith in elections or top-down reforms. Anarchists challenge the very premise of centralized authority. Russia’s anarchist community is no exception. They were among the first to sharply criticize the Putin regime, the security services’ repressive practices, and the war. Some activists have deliberately embraced more radical forms of protest and resistance.

This is precisely why anarchists ended up on the front lines of repression. The state used them as a testing ground for methods that the authorities applied far more broadly against any dissenters a few years later. In this sense, the persecution of anarchists serves as an indicator — a means of understanding the direction in which the Russian state and its security apparatus are headed. Even now, as repression has become widespread (according to the project “Support for Political Prisoners. Memorial,” at least 11,000 people in Russia are imprisoned on politically motivated charges), and 15-year sentences no longer shock anyone, anarchists continue to face heightened pressure and record-setting prison terms. Their history of persecution offers insight into how this machine operates and how it is likely to evolve.

For the past 25 years, Russia’s authoritarian system has relied on war, both external and internal, to survive. When Vladimir Putin first came to power in 1999 as head of the FSB, the Second Chechen War was underway. The federal government portrayed Chechen separatists as external enemies while simultaneously launching a campaign against internal enemies — namely, political opponents of the liberal and left-wing political persuasion. In the years that followed, the Kremlin launched wars in Georgia and Ukraine, intervened in Syria, and engaged in military operations across Africa. At the same time, domestic repression intensified. A notable turning point came with the Bolotnaya case, which involved the criminal prosecution of participants in an anti-government march on the eve of Putin’s inauguration for a third term on May 6, 2012. There were more than 30 defendants, many of whom were left-wing activists and anarchists. This case marked a pivotal shift, showing that the government was ready to use criminal statutes on a large scale against protesters. Simultaneously, the State Duma passed a wave of repressive legislation that restricted freedom of assembly and increased penalties. As a result, the state gradually dismantled legal avenues for protest.

For the authorities, anarchists have always been a particular target. Unlike liberal opposition figures, who still attempted to participate in elections or parliamentary campaigns even after Putin and his circle had consolidated control, anarchists cannot be drawn into a managed political game. The state has no “carrot” for anarchists, only the “stick”: detentions, raids, criminal cases, and torture. By the late 2010s, repression against anarchists had escalated to a new level, a trend that has only continued to intensify.

Security Services Cast a Wide Net

The defining episode in the recent history of political repression against anarchists in Russia is the “Network” (“Set’’) case. For the first time, a group of people who had not carried out a single attack — or anything the authorities could plausibly call an attack — were designated a terrorist organization. This fact, coupled with the brutal torture inflicted on the defendants, drew the attention of the media and the general public. Support for the imprisoned activists quickly spread beyond anarchist circles. At the same time, the case became mythologized, and the defendants were elevated to hero status. However, when subsequent reporting challenged that narrative, public support dropped sharply, and the reputation of Russian anarchists suffered.

The “Network” case formally began with what appeared to be an insignificant incident. On October 17, 2017, police in Penza detained Egor Zorin, a student. According to the case file, Zorin was found in possession of psychoactive substances, and toxicology tests revealed the presence of opiates, amphetamines, and synthetic cannabinoids in his blood. This incident ultimately resulted in the imprisonment of ten anarchists and antifascists and forced several dozen others to flee Russia. Zorin wrote a “voluntary confession,” claiming that he and his acquaintances were part of a terrorist organization. He was released from criminal liability for “participation in a terrorist organization,” receiving only a three-year suspended sentence for drug possession.

From October to November 2017, authorities in Penza detained anarchists and antifascists Ilya Shakursky, Dmitry Pchelintsev, Vasily Kuksov, and Andrei Chernov based on Zorin’s statements. In early November, police in St. Petersburg arrested another activist, Arman Sagynbayev. In January, they detained three more: Yulian Boyarshinov, Igor Shishkin, and Viktor Filinkov. The FSB apprehended all of them, tortured them, and pressured them to confess to participating in a terrorist cell and plotting to seize power. After being tortured, all but Kuksov signed confessions.

In the summer of 2018, authorities in Moscow detained two fugitives, Maxim Ivankin and Mikhail Kulkov, and linked them to the Penza branch of the “Network” case. The two had previously been detained for a different reason: in March 2017, they and a minor named Alexei Poltavets were arrested with 8.6 grams of “bath salts” divided into 31 packages — the quantity indicating an intent to sell. Kulkov was placed under house arrest, Ivankin was ordered not to leave town, and Poltavets was allowed to remain only a witness. In April 2017, Kulkov and Ivankin fled and were declared wanted. Around the same time, Zorin first came to the FSB’s attention when agents caught him smoking marijuana in early March 2017, but let him go. Officially, these incidents were not linked to the “Network” case at the time, but they did precede the mass arrests in October 2017.

While it is impossible to know for certain, it appears that the Penza anarchists and antifascists came under FSB scrutiny following their initial drug-related detentions. One unresolved question is why Zorin was released after his first encounter with FSB agents. It is possible that he had already become an informant or a surveillance target. Neither Zorin nor Kulkov was considered an active member of the anarchist or antifascist movement, though they were loosely connected to several activists.

Igor Shishkin, a St. Petersburg antifascist, was the first defendant to be sentenced in the “Network” case. Although he was one of the last to be detained, he appears to have been subjected to the harshest torture. By that time, investigators had already extracted confessions from the other defendants; Kuksov was the only one who had not confessed at that early stage. Shishkin chose to accept a plea deal, providing detailed testimony against himself and others. As a result, he received the lightest sentence: three and a half years in prison.

During the Penza trial, prosecutors charged Ilya Shakursky, Dmitry Pchelintsev, Vasily Kuksov, Andrei Chernov, Maxim Ivankin, and Mikhail Kulkov. None of the defendants pleaded guilty, and all reported torture and coercion. Nevertheless, the court handed down sentences ranging from six to eighteen years. Shakursky and Pchelintsev, designated by prosecutors as “cell leaders of a terrorist organization,” received the harshest sentences of sixteen and eighteen years, respectively. 

In the summer of 2020, courts issued sentences to the St. Petersburg branch. Viktor Filinkov, who maintained his innocence, received seven years. Yulian Boyarshinov, who accepted the charges, received five and a half years.

From the moment the first reports of torture emerged, politically active Russians responded with outrage. While support largely took the form of open letters and media coverage, street protests, small rallies, and solo pickets also occurred. Many were appalled by the accounts of torture and the fabrication of a terrorism case. Although the FSB had long used torture, it had primarily targeted groups viewed as “alien” by most Russians, such as Chechen separatists. Such abuses rarely received independent media attention. In contrast, anarchists and antifascists earned respect in liberal circles during the 2000s for resisting neo-Nazi violence. Many journalists came from antifascist backgrounds.

Another episode emerged between Penza and St. Petersburg verdicts, sharply eroding public support for the defendants. In February 2020, Meduza published an investigation suggesting that the disappearance of Artyom Dorofeyev and Ekaterina Levchenko in Ryazan in 2017 might be linked to Maxim Ivankin and Alexei Poltavets. According to the report, the couple had helped friends distribute drugs, knew about the group’s activities, and, exhausted by life on the run, had planned to return home. For the other participants, this posed a risk that, under interrogation, Dorofeyev and Levchenko might cooperate with investigators.

The two were murdered in a forest outside Ryazan. According to Poltavets, who lives abroad, Ivankin shot Dorofeyev first and then finished him off, while Poltavets killed Levchenko. Poltavets and several other sources also claimed that Dmitry Pchelintsev participated in the decision to “eliminate” them. However, Russia’s Investigative Committee found no evidence of this, and Pchelintsev was not given any official status in connection with this case.

In 2024, a jury in the Ryazan regional court found Maxim Ivankin guilty of murdering Dorofeyev and Levchenko. Taking into account his previous “Network” conviction, he was sentenced to twenty-four years in prison. Poltavets has not faced trial in Russia.

From “The Network” to “People’s Self-Defense”

Despite the crackdown on anarchists in Penza and St. Petersburg, anarchist groups in other regions didn’t slow down; rather, they intensified their activity. Each action, however, triggered a swift and heavy response from law enforcement. When officers couldn’t identify the real organizers or participants, they targeted whoever was within reach. This resulted in surveillance, pressure, raids, and, ultimately, criminal cases.

On the night of January 31, 2018, unknown individuals attacked the United Russia office in the Khovrino district of Moscow, smashing a window and throwing a smoke device inside. Anarchists published a statement claiming responsibility for the attack and calling for a boycott of the upcoming presidential election, which they described as a farce.

A few days later, on February 10, Moscow anarchists marched down Myasnitskaya Street to protest abuses by the FSB. The unsanctioned demonstration involved participants walking along the roadway, chanting slogans, setting off pyrotechnics, and carrying a banner that read, “The FSB Is the Main Terrorist.” This slogan had become widely known after the “Network” case and reflected how the security service was perceived.

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In response, a wave of arrests began in mid-February. On February 13, officers raided the home of Yelena Gorban, an anarchist, and took her in for interrogation after searching the home. On the same day, police broke down the door of anarchist Alexei Kobaidze’s home and detained him. They both became suspects in the vandalism case connected to the attack on the United Russia office and spent two days in detention on Petrovka Street before being released under travel restrictions.

Meanwhile, on February 4, Russia’s Main Directorate for Combating Extremism received a statement from a man named Yevgeny Popov. He claimed that “Network” cells were operating across Russia and were allegedly coordinated by Dmitry Pchelintsev and “Dmitry Rechkalov.” It is likely that he meant Svyatoslav Rechkalov, whom security officers would later label the “Moscow leader” of the organization.

A second round of raids occurred on March 14. The police searched the homes of Left Bloc and anarchist activists, including Rechkalov. He was accused of involvement in the Khovrino office attack, subjected to torture, and pressured to confess to organizing anarchist actions and leading “The Network.” Although his name was eventually removed from the indictment in the “broken window case,” internal documents from the Interior Ministry’s Centre for Combating Extremism continued to list him as the “organizer of a terrorist community” and a key link between Moscow anarchists. Rechkalov denied any connection to “The Network,” calling it an FSB invention designed to expand the scope of the case nationwide by appointing him its “leader.”

According to Rechkalov, he was an activist with “People’s Self-Defense,” a movement focused on social struggles — defending dormitory residents, confronting abusive employers, organizing street protests, and campaigning against real-estate raiders. In an interview with Radio Liberty, he said that this real-world activism and the group’s visibility made him an attractive target for the FSB. Unlike the fictitious “Network,” “People’s Self-Defense” actually existed and had public platforms. After being arrested and tortured, Rechkalov fled Russia and obtained political asylum in France.

Similar processes unfolded elsewhere. In Chelyabinsk, on the night of February 14–15, anarchists hung a banner that read “The FSB Is the Main Terrorist” on the fence of the local FSB headquarters. Five days later, the police detained Anastasia Safonova and Dmitry Tsybukovsky and opened a criminal case that dragged on for years. Opening a criminal case over a banner was unprecedented at the time.

The Arkhangelsk Explosion

The state’s repression of anarchists, particularly the torture used against defendants in the “Network” case and other political prisoners, produced the opposite of its intended effect. Realizing the futility of peaceful protest, some anarchists began considering more radical methods.

On October 31, 2018, 17-year-old anarchist Mikhail Zhlobitsky detonated a bomb inside an FSB office in Arkhangelsk, killing himself and injuring three FSB employees.

Seven minutes before the explosion, he posted a message in an anarchist Telegram chat:

“Comrades, in a moment, a terrorist attack will take place at the FSB office in Arkhangelsk, and I take responsibility for it. The reasons are clear to you. Since the FSB has lost all limits, fabricating cases and torturing people, I have decided to take this step. I will most likely die in the blast since I am the one to trigger the bomb by pressing a button attached to me. I ask you to spread information about the attack, including who carried it out and why. That’s all, I guess. I wish you an unwavering and uncompromising commitment to our goal. May you see a bright future of anarchist communism!”

People from a wide spectrum of political views sought to contextualize or explain the teenager’s desperate act. However, any comment that failed to explicitly condemn the attack could lead to prosecution under Russia’s “justification of terrorism” statute — an offense punishable by up to seven years in prison. Both anarchists and journalists, as well as ordinary social media users, were caught up in this new wave of repression.

The “Broken Windows” Case

Just three months after the Arkhangelsk bombing, a new round of repression against anarchists began. On February 1, 2019, police raided the homes of anarchists and left-wing activists in Moscow and the Moscow region. Human rights groups reported that about ten people were detained, most of whom were soon released. However, Azat Miftakhov, a mathematics graduate student at Moscow State University and a prominent anarchist, was kept in custody.

Investigators accused him of making explosives and linked him to a mock device found near a gas pipeline in Balashikha in January 2018. Miftakhov reported that he was tortured and beaten in an attempt to force him to confess. At one point, he attempted to cut his wrists to avoid further torture.

A parallel pressure campaign unfolded on the Telegram channel “Oper Slil,” which is notorious for leaking law enforcement information. As early as July 2018, the channel featured a post about Miftakhov, and in January 2019, it published his photograph and passport alongside a threat: “We warned you — stop messing around.” After his arrest, the channel taunted Miftakhov by posting compromising material, including intimate photos. This steady stream of leaks appeared to be an extension of state pressure.

On February 7, the explosives case against Miftakhov formally collapsed, and he was “released,” only to be detained again immediately, this time for the January 31, 2018, attack on the United Russia office, in which the window was smashed, and a smoke device was thrown inside. Unlike the other two defendants, Yelena Gorban and Andrei Eikin, who admitted to participating in the attack, Miftakhov denied all wrongdoing.

The prosecution relied on the testimony of an anonymous witness named “Petrov,” who claimed to have recognized Miftakhov by his “distinctive eyebrows” a year later. Another witness, “Karaulny,” embellished the story with vague accounts of “anarchist combat training.”

In January 2021, Moscow’s Golovinsky District Court sentenced Azat Miftakhov to six years in a general-regime penal colony. The other defendants received suspended sentences: Gorban received four years, and Eikin received two. Human rights organizations and scholars worldwide denounced the case as fabricated, recognizing Miftakhov as a political prisoner.

Anarchists against the War

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, anarchists, like many other Russian residents, were subjected to a new wave of repression. The crackdown targeted all forms of protest against Russia’s aggression. However, the pressure on anarchists has often been harsher than that on other dissenters. Authorities view anarchists as not only ideological enemies but also as activists who tend to be at the forefront of resistance.

Immediately after February 24, many anarchists began putting up leaflets and painting anti-war and anti-government graffiti. That same day, several hundred anarchists and antifascists marched through Moscow. In short, many made their position clear from the outset. Predictably, law enforcement took note, adding anarchists to their list of people to pressure.

On February 27, anarchist groups participated in nationwide protests against the invasion. They stood out for their organization and the banners they carried. In Moscow, the group “Food Not Bombs” carried a banner reading, “No State! No War!” Another group unfurled a large banner that read, “Peace to the People, War on the Rulers!” In the first case, police in helmets and flak jackets rushed the activists and violently twisted their arms despite no resistance. Footage shows officers eager to seize and hide the banner as quickly as possible.

According to the detained anarchists, whenever the police knew they were dealing with anarchists, the detainees were questioned not only by regular officers, but also by Centre for Combating Extremism staff and sometimes the FSB. These officers tried to probe the detainees’ motivations, intimidate them, or extract information about anarchist networks. After my own detention on February 27, one officer, apparently from the Centre for Combating Extremism, even suggested that I could “work with them against the Nazis.” “You’re antifascists, after all,” he said.

Although anarchists were detained in the same way as others, security forces treated them more harshly and more thoroughly, routinely involving the Centre for Combating Extremism and the FSB.

By March 2022, the mass protests in Russia had been suppressed. At the same time, some anarchists turned to partisan tactics. “Anarchist Fighter”, the largest anarchist channel on the Russian internet, began openly encouraging the burning of military recruitment offices and the sabotage of railway lines used by the military.

In May 2022, the Anarcho-Communist Combat Organization (BOAK), which is associated with the “Anarchist Fighter” channel, claimed responsibility for its first operation. Partisans sabotaged a railway line leading to a facility operated by the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense by loosening and separating the rails. In June, BOAK carried out a similar operation on a line serving the 51st Arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate near Kirzhach.

Following these attacks, security forces cracked down on any anarchists they could reach, including subscribers to anarchist channels with no connection to BOAK.

The “Network” Case 2.0

In this atmosphere, police in Tyumen detained two anarchists — Deniz Aydin and Kirill Brik — at the end of August 2022. They had gone to an empty lot to test a homemade explosive device. This alone could have been enough for criminal charges. However, the officers wanted more, perhaps drawn by the prospect of bonuses or promotions for “uncovering” a terrorist organization. In Russia today, this is common: charges related to terrorism carry particular weight, and investigators try to stretch cases into that category whenever possible.

Deniz and Kirill were tortured. They were beaten, had their joints twisted, were suffocated with a plastic bag, and were threatened with rape using a police baton or a mop. The investigators wanted confessions about planned bombings and the existence of a terrorist group. At some point, unable to withstand the torture, the two signed statements written by the police. Thus began the “Network Case” 2.0.

In the following days, their friends in neighboring regions were also detained.

On August 31, police in Yekaterinburg arrested Danil Chertykov and Yuri Neznamov. Yuri had long been part of the antifascist movement and was well known beyond Yekaterinburg as a reliable comrade. Danil is an anarchist, musician, and veterinarian. Both were tortured in an attempt to force them to confess to involvement in a terrorist organization.

The last to be detained were Nikita Oleinik and Roman Paklin from Surgut. They are anarchists who founded the libertarian library “Burevestnik.” During a previous wave of far-right violence, they successfully resisted neo-Nazis in street confrontations. They were tortured, too.

Initially, investigators did not specify what the anarchists had allegedly planned to blow up. They were all charged with participating in a terrorist organization, a crime punishable by five to ten years in prison. Nikita Oleinik was named the organizer and faces between 15 years to life.

Later, the charges became slightly more specific. According to investigators, the accused planned to bomb government buildings and railway infrastructure and to attack state officials, all in the name of creating a society without centralized authority. This language is taken almost verbatim from the case materials.

The trial has now been underway for more than a year at the Central District Military Court in Yekaterinburg. Kirill Brik received eight years in prison after taking a plea deal. The others deny guilt and continue to fight the charges.

The “Chita Case”

Another major case against anarchists emerged in the fall of 2022. On October 31, police in Chita detained 16-year-old Lyubov Lizunova and 19-year-old Aleksandr Snezhkov while they were painting the graffiti “Death to the Regime!” It later came to light that the FSB had been monitoring them for their alleged involvement in the Telegram channels Shugan-25 and 75ZLO, which reported on arson attacks against recruitment offices and railway sabotage. The two were charged with vandalism, “justifying terrorism,” and inciting extremist activity.

In April 2024, Lyubov was sentenced to three and a half years in prison, Snezhkov to six years, and 23-year-old Vladislav Vishnevsky,  the third defendant, to one and a half years of forced labor.

New Charges against Prisoners

In recent years, Russia has increasingly imposed additional sentences on individuals already serving time for political offenses. The pretext is often something allegedly said in conversation with other inmates that investigators deem to be “justifying terrorism.”

Immediately after his release in September 2023, Azat Miftakhov was detained again. Based on testimony from other prisoners, he was charged with “justifying terrorism” and given another four years — this time in a prison rather than a penal colony, which has harsher conditions.

In September 2025, Aleksandr Snezhkov received a similar sentence. According to investigators, he “incited terrorism” simply by reading to cellmates excerpts from his case materials, including a post from the Telegram channel he administered. The court ruled that these words could “inspire extremism,” even though most of his cellmates were already under investigation for terrorism. Combining the new term with the unserved portion of the previous sentence, Snezhkov received five years, the first three of which will be served in prison.

Cases for Direct Action

While not unique to anarchists, cases involving direct action, such as arson at recruitment offices or railway sabotage aimed at disrupting military logistics, are part of the broader landscape of repression against anti-authoritarian activists.

Currently, two anarchists are known to have received lengthy sentences for such actions. Alexei Rozhkov from Yekaterinburg received 16 years for setting fire to a recruitment office in March 2022. Anarchist partisan Ruslan Sidiki received 29 years for two sabotage attacks on military infrastructure, the longest sentence ever given for such crimes. In the summer of 2023, he used drones to attack a military airfield near Ryazan, damaging a runway. Later that fall, he blew up a railway line used by the military, causing 19 freight cars to derail and blocking a key logistics route.

Another insurgent, anarchist Roman Shvedov from the Rostov region, died by suicide after being sentenced in December 2024. He was sentenced to 16 years in prison for setting fire to a local administration building that housed a draft commission.

International Solidarity and Support

Under these conditions, Russian anarchists are forced to either operate semi-legally without openly identifying as anarchists or go fully underground. We usually learn about anarchist groups either from anonymous Telegram channels or when their members are arrested. Attempts to operate openly, even in entirely non-radical ways, trigger severe repression. For instance, in the summer of 2025, members of the Yekaterinburg Anarchist Confederation — best known for organizing Food Not Bombs events — were detained and tortured.

In this environment, the anarchist movement in Russia urgently needs international solidarity. This can take the form of distributing information in various languages or supporting imprisoned activists.

Many imprisoned anarchists say that the best form of solidarity is to continue the struggle. Today, the central issue in the region remains Russia’s war in Ukraine. The Russian army bombards Ukrainian cities, killing civilians almost daily. Some towns have been wiped off the map. In occupied territories, Russian authorities carry out arbitrary detentions, torture pro-Ukrainian civilians, and conduct extrajudicial killings. The war also strengthens the power of Putin’s ruling clique — and as long as the army maintains its presence in Ukraine, meaningful social change in Russia is nearly impossible.

The “Anarchist Black Cross – Moscow” (ABC-Moscow), which supported anarchist prisoners for years, has now been designated an “undesirable organization” and forced to focus on evacuating persecuted activists and aiding political refugees.

The newly formed collective Fires of Freedom, as well as numerous smaller support groups, now provide direct support for imprisoned anarchists and antifascists in Russia. 

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^{They can be contacted at:}

^{ABC-Moscow: abc-msk@riseup.net}

^{Fires of Freedom: firesoffreedom@protonmail.com}

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