Astrakhan Region during the War

What is the Astrakhan Region?

The Astrakhan Region is a small southern region of Russia, in the deserts near the Caspian Sea, with the Volga, Europe's largest river, flowing through it. Its population is under a million, roughly the size of Delaware, and its area is slightly smaller than West Virginia’s. It is a multinational region, primarily consisting of Russian and Muslim peoples. The latter accounts for 30 percent of the total population. However, there is no interethnic tension because these peoples have lived together for centuries, forming a unified community.

In her book Patriotism from Below, French sociologist Karine Clément, who conducted field research in Russia for over 15 years, characterizes Astrakhan as a region with an extremely low level of “state patriotism” — the notion that equates the state with the country. While 43% of respondents in Moscow held such patriotic views, only 7% of respondents in Astrakhan did. Three-quarters of the respondents associated patriotism with the concept of “people.” For them, it was about the feeling of pain for the poverty and powerlessness in their country and the need to correct it.

The region is rich in oil and gas, ranking 20th in Russia in terms of GDP per capita (overall, there are 83 regions in the country, not including the annexed ones). However, these excellent indicators are not reflected in the population's income.

Most of the population used to work in the fishing, agriculture, food, and shipbuilding industries. However, labor automation, the bankruptcy of many factories, and the depletion of fish stocks have forced workers into unstable and low-paying jobs in small businesses, services, and trade. Small businesses are plagued by a corrupt bureaucracy that awards lucrative government contracts for road repairs or hospital equipment only to firms that enrich officials. However, even these revenues collapsed after 2014, when Russia severed ties with the West. Investments in fixed assets also plummeted. While they amounted to 245 billion rubles in 2013, they totaled only 87 billion by the end of 2023. This means that they fell by 87% when adjusted for inflation and constant prices.

By 2023, Astrakhan residents' incomes had fallen to 72% of their 2014 level, resulting in a significant labor migration. While 1,027,000 people lived there in 2018, the population fell to 945,000 by 2024. This dramatic decline indicates that the most mobile, skilled, adaptable, and energetic workers are leaving in large numbers.

The slight income increase among Russians since the war started didn't reach the Astrakhan region. While Russia experienced a 7.4% increase in income in the first half of 2024 (although it is actually less due to underestimated inflation data), the Astrakhan region only saw a 3.6% increase.

According to the local government, 67% of young people in the region are unhappy with the way things are going, 61% are considering moving away, and 10% are currently in the process of doing so.

At the same time, the population is heavily indebted. While the ban on traveling abroad due to outstanding bank loans affects 6% of the population in Russia, in the Astrakhan region, it affects more than 25%. These are court decisions affecting 230,000 debtors. Note that these figures include children and the elderly, who do not take out loans. Thus, the actual proportion of insolvent debtors is much higher among the working-age population. It is about half of that population.

Not only does the region have low wages, but the living conditions are deteriorating. Last winter, when the temperature was subzero, the region experienced massive sewage leaks that spread and froze for two to three weeks. In the summer, there are constant water shortages. 65% of drinking water samples do not meet standards. The percentage of the population with access to centralized drinking water has dropped from 80.5% in 2019 to 77% in 2022. Two five-story residential buildings collapsed in one year due to wear and tear. It was only by a miracle that the death toll was limited to one person.

Personal Outlook 

Personal outlooks are always biased because they stem from one's circle of acquaintances, which is based on personal preferences.

Undeniably, the full-scale war has divided society. Even in Astrakhan, where “state patriotism” is low, the early days of the war aroused great enthusiasm among a significant portion of the population. As in the rest of Russia, support for the war was higher among older age groups, the main audience of state television, who did not risk being sent to the front. Young people were more skeptical, though opinions varied greatly from person to person.

​​One of my coworkers, a young Azerbaijani woman, was a strong supporter of the war. Her brother was a military contractor, so it's likely that her family saw the war as an opportunity to make money. Another former colleague of mine, whose husband I visited to repair his car, also had a brother who served in the army and reenlisted. She viewed the war as a natural disaster: one could only wait for it to end.

The former principal of the school where I had studied, an intelligent and ironic elderly Tatar man, had an extremely negative view of the war and, in particular, Putin. He used expressions that, though not obscene, were inappropriate for print. He recently passed away, so I can talk about him without worrying that it will cause him any trouble.

Another good friend of mine, who is much younger than I am, was very skeptical of the ruling regime. At first, he even campaigned against the war on social media. However, he later told me that he had signed a contract in hopes of making some money that way.

One time, while I was at the playground with my daughter, the wife of a mobilized soldier started talking to me. She asked me when it would all end and said that her husband thought the war was unnecessary and pointless, and that it should never have started.

People knew about my anti-war views, which I had never hidden, and I often received friendly support from drunk men outside the grocery store or elderly housing association chairmen who visited me. Of course, there were people with different views, but apart from a few officials led by the governor, no one reproached me for my position.

I also participated in intense discussions on social media. People tend to say things online that they would never dare say face-to-face. Thus, the online picture was more diverse. I had many conversations on my social media pages, including with supporters of the war. Overall, the conversations were constructive; there were no insults. Of course, every once in a while, there were comments about “betrayal,” and I blocked those people, but there weren't many of them.

At the same time, I couldn't express myself completely freely, either. For example, I couldn't post photos of destroyed cities or of people who were shot. Strictly speaking, I couldn't even mention Ukraine in the context of the war. Making two direct statements would have resulted in a criminal case, yet they would not have enlightened a lot of people.

Therefore, I had to conduct anti-war propaganda indirectly. I wrote about the value of peace, the evil of aggression, and internationalism. Everyone knew what I meant. Quotes from Hitler particularly angered supporters of the war because they reflected Russian propaganda narratives almost word for word.

‍Drone Attacks

In what ways has the war affected the region? Although the actual fighting is taking place somewhere far away, it does not affect everyday life. In May 2024, Ukrainian drones flew to the Astrakhan Gazprom plant for the first time, causing some damage. However, nothing like this has happened since then. Since June 2024, Akhtubinsk, the region’s second-largest city and home to a major air base, has been the target of regular attacks. Reports indicate that the SU-57, a super-modern Russian fifth-generation fighter jet with a fleet of no more than thirty, was damaged.

Finally, on August 15, 2025, the drones reached the port of Olya, a key Russian facility on the Caspian Sea used to transport military cargo from Iran. Ten drones were shot down, but four struck a ship loaded with ammunition and components for Shahed drones supplied by Iran. The ship sank in shallow water.

That covers all the military action in the region. There were no reports of casualties, though there were injuries at Gazprom. By comparison, many more people drowned while swimming in rivers during that time.

Therefore, there is no immediate danger. Life goes on calmly, peacefully, and relaxed. The only exception is that prices have risen significantly, which is nothing new to people who have witnessed five other episodes of inflation, including more severe ones.

Military Losses 

Payments to contract soldiers from the local budget increased rapidly. In spring 2023, the amount was modest at 75,000 rubles, but by summer, it had doubled. Since the beginning of 2024, the amount has risen again, first to 250,000 rubles, and then, in August 2024, it quadrupled to one million rubles. Finally, at the beginning of 2025, a law was passed setting the amount at 1.6 million rubles. Thus, in two years, these payments increased 22-folds.

In January 2024, local media reported that over 4,000 Astrakhan residents were on the front lines. As of the end of November 2023, however, only 2,500 people had signed contracts, some of whom had already been killed or discharged due to injury. This indicates that at least 2,000 people were mobilized, corresponding to the region's share of Russia's population.

In 2024, a one-time allocation of 2 billion rubles was made from the regional budget for the contracts. This allowed for another 3,000 contracts to be signed. However, it could have been done by conscripts though (they are not allowed to leave the front, but they could receive money this way). Therefore, there may be double-counting.

Clearly, the flow of willing applicants began to dry up. As noted above, payments rose to 1 million in the summer of 2024 and to 1.6 million in early 2025. Clearly, this was not from a good life. About 1,000 more contracts were signed in the first half of 2025.

In January 2024, regional authorities — and this is a unique, one-of-a-kind case in the entire country — reported that 1,112 people had been killed since the start of the war; officials decided to place their names on a local memorial. This figure was approximately 1.5 times higher than estimates from independent experts who relied on public obituary data. However, it did not include a significant number of missing persons.

From January to June 2025, another 465 families received funeral payments. Taking those missing in action into account, we are looking at approximately 2,000 deaths out of an estimated 6,000–8,000 conscripts who signed contracts. For comparison, only 37 Astrakhan residents died during the ten-year war in Afghanistan.

Why do People Sign Military Contracts? 

As I mentioned above, incomes in the region are extremely low. In August 2025, the online service Work in Russia analyzed 6,000 job applications from residents of Astrakhan. The average salary expectations were 37,000 rubles ($470) per month, while the salary offers were 32,000 rubles ($400). These payments will be 13% lower since even the smallest salaries in Russia are taxed.

Of course, prices differ from those in the US, but even taking into account the “hamburger index,” these figures can only be multiplied by two at most. In other words, we are talking about the possibility of living somewhere in Kentucky on $800 a month. 

What promise does a military contract hold? The one-time federal payment upon signing the contract is 400,000 rubles; the regional payment is an additional 1.6 million rubles, for a total of two million rubles (approximately $25,000, assuming price parity). After signing the contract, the monthly payment is 204,000 rubles ($2,550). In case of serious injury and dismissal from service, the payment is 3.4 million rubles ($43,000). In case of serious injury but with continued service, the payment is 3 million ($37,500). For moderate injury, the payment is 1 million rubles ($12,500). For minor injury, the payment is 100,000 rubles ($1,250). The Astrakhan budget allocates an additional 500,000 rubles ($6,250) for serious injury and 250,000 rubles ($3,170) for moderate injury.

In the event of the death of a contract soldier, the “presidential payment” is 5 million rubles. State insurance provides an additional 3.4 million rubles, and the payment from the Astrakhan budget is an additional 1 million, for a total of 9.4 million rubles, or $117,500.

And then again, prices are lower than in the US. Various perks are also offered, such as free, government-funded university spots for the children and wives of the military, loan forgiveness of up to 10 million rubles ( $125,000), and more. Against the backdrop of the bleak poverty described above, one should be more surprised by a small number of people who sign military contracts than by the practice itself.

There is, of course, an ideological component, but it serves not so much as a motivation but as a justification for taking part in war. They say it's not about the money. However, it's clear that if the payments for military contracts matched the average salary, the number of enrollees would be in the single digits.

Prisoners convicted primarily of serious crimes deserve special mention. According to a leading state agency, one of them was a murderer of three people, including a mother and her daughter, whom he strangled with a rope.

The Budget of the Region  

The impact of the war on the regional budget must be addressed separately. Despite the presence of oil companies, the region receives subsidies. This is because the mineral extraction tax goes to the federal budget. In this case, however, we are interested in trends.

Taking inflation into account, which was 30% over the three years of war, according to official data, the region's revenues fell by 13%. This decline was primarily due to a 42% decrease in subsidies from the federal budget, but income tax revenues also decreased by one-third.

Income tax generated some growth, fines imposed on the population doubled, and taxes on small businesses increased by 80%, but this was not enough to cover the budget deficit. As a result, programs for repairing roads and water pipes, eliminating landfills, and purchasing equipment for hospitals were completely overhauled.

Direct financing of military expenditures has added to the challenges. In the current year's budget, payments to military personnel, as well as to their relatives in the event of their death, will amount to 3.5 billion rubles. This amounts to 5% of the region's budget and 1% of regional GDP. It is reasonable to assume that the situation in most Russian regions is not significantly different.

Repression    

Since the region did not see any major anti-war protests, the level of repression was relatively moderate. It is also worth noting that the local FSB branch deals with actual Islamic extremists. Seventy-two volunteers left Astrakhan for ISIS, and there was even a gang in Astrakhan that committed several terrorist crimes. Therefore, the special services in Astrakhan have real work to do and little free time to persecute political dissidents. In addition, some of the persecution for anti-war positions was disguised as something other than “discrediting the army” articles. In spring 2022, two labor union activists, who shared videos of destroyed Ukrainian cities and the civilians being shot via WhatsApp, were arrested and spent several months in prison. Officially, they were charged with resisting the police during a routine document check. Subsequently, one received a suspended prison sentence, and the other emigrated.

A portal that analyzes political persecution in Russia has tracked eight criminal cases opened for anti-war statements. Only one person, a resident of Akhtubinsk, was sentenced to actual imprisonment. The others were fined, but if they reoffend, they will face actual prison time.

In addition, there were administrative cases launched for “discrediting the army.” In 2022, 26 people had to pay fines of an average of 30,000 rubles (equivalent to the average monthly salary). Nine more people were fined for picketing and other public protests, and 21 were fined for displaying extremist symbols, including photographs of Navalny.

Data for 2023 is unavailable since the 2022 files were mistakenly duplicated, but the numbers would most likely be similar. In 2024 alone, 24 people were held administratively accountable for anti-war statements, 35 for displaying  “extremist symbols,” and one person was fined 80,000 rubles for carrying a poster.

In summary, several conclusions can be drawn: 

1) The Astrakhan region is an example of an extremely resource-rich region whose population lives in deep poverty. Over the past ten years, workers' incomes have fallen by at least a quarter, investment has collapsed, and one in every fifteen families has left the region for economic reasons.

2) Astrakhan residents are not prone to “state patriotism” or nationalism, but they do have empathy for their country and its people. When the freedom of political debate is destroyed, this sense can be exploited by propaganda.

3) The payments for military contracts are dramatically disproportionate to the income of workers, but even these payments had to be increased 22 times in two years to ensure a relatively small influx of contract soldiers.

4) The regional budget has shrunk by a seventh and incurs serious military costs at the expense of infrastructure. 

5) At the same time, there are no direct military hardships, and the population simply lives in a state of permanent crisis. However, there is no immediate threat to life or property.

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