Raising a Soldier: The Militarization of Russian Childhood

From the earliest weeks of the war, images of children performing military drills in schoolyards, marching stiffly in formation or practicing combat maneuvers, have become disturbingly common across Russia. On September 1, 2023, the government officially introduced mandatory Basic Military Training (BMT) in all schools nationwide, firmly embedding a military orientation into the education system. These classes expose children to everything we hope to shield them from in a world aspiring to peace: students learn to throw grenades, assemble assault rifles, shoot, and act in “extreme situations and military operations.” Schools invite war veterans into classrooms to share their combat experience. “This experience is especially valuable at a pivotal moment in our country’s development,” Vladimir Putin declared in 2023. Today, more than a thousand former combatants are employed in schools and youth organizations.

Yet the militarization of Russian childhood extends far beyond BMT. Beginning in first grade, students attend “Conversations About Important Things”, where they’re taught about patriotism and readiness to defend the nation. Hundreds of thousands of children spend their free time in the militarized youth group Yunarmiya, while participants in Zarnitsa 2.0 play at being drone operators, paratroopers, or war correspondents. None of this appeared overnight. Government-backed patriotic education programs with strong military elements date back to the early years of Putin’s presidency, long before war seemed imminent. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbas, these youth organizations recieved a more formal and structured role in society. But how effective are these efforts? What will Russian children carry into adulthood: the sunshine of first love and discovery or memories of combat training, enemy narratives, and snippets of Putin’s rhetoric? Perhaps all of the above.

Where Patriotism Begins

Few people openly claim to be unpatriotic. In fact, patriotism has become one of the few ideological values to enjoy broad consensus between the Russian state and society since the early 2000s. The memory of the Great Patriotic War is central to this shared identity. But patriotism is not a monolith. In a 2014, a Levada Center study found that a majority of Russians defined patriotism simply as “love for the motherland,” pride in national achievements, and a willingness to contribute to the country’s development. At the same time, 84% agreed that patriotism is a deep personal feeling, and that each individual has the right to decide what it means. Only 21% said that a true patriot must support the government no matter what. 

Official rhetoric, however, blends love of country with loyalty to the state. But adds another crucial element: a willingness to defend it. This version of patriotism helped justify the war for many Russians. It motivated some to weave camouflage nets and donate supplies for the army to avoid mobilization. Yet for others, patriotism meant something very different: a sense of anxiety and responsibility for the nation’s future. That version gave rise to protest, exile, and the quiet determination to stay connected and hope for peace.

In 2001, shortly after Putin took office, the government launched its first five-year patriotic education initiative with Resolution N122. The stated goal was to unify society around familiar values, reduce internal divisions, and restore the prestige of military service. The plan included a media strategy to combat “fake” interpretations of Russian history, especially online, as well as funding for patriotic films and books. Children were a core target audience: schools hosted “Lessons in Courage,” revived military-themed sports games, and established youth patriotic clubs. The Ministry of Defense was among three key institutions responsible for implementation. The budget for the first program (2001–2005) was modest: just 178 million rubles ($6.14 million), comparable to other federal initiatives at the time. But by the next cycle (2006–2010), funding jumped tenfold to 1.5 billion rubles ($53 million). Over the next 15 years, growth was gradual, until 2021, when annual spending surged to 3.5 billion rubles ($47.5 million), even as the country was still grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic.

In 2022, the budget for patriotic education climbed to nearly 5 billion rubles ($67.8 million). But actual expenditures were even higher: 11.4 billion rubles to counter growing dissent toward the war, especially by young people. In 2024, the allocated budget soared to 46 billion rubles ($495 million). The plan for 2025 is even more staggering: over 66 billion rubles ($684 million). The exploding financial investment is  increasingly visible in classrooms, playgrounds, and after-school programs.

We Will Serve Russia Faithfully and Truthfully

One of the most striking outcomes of the Russian government’s patriotic policy has been the creation of the youth military-patriotic organization Yunarmiya (Youth Army). Launched in the fall of 2016, Yunarmiya is often compared to the Hitler Youth due to its militarized uniforms, hierarchical structure, strict discipline, and dissemination of state propaganda narratives.

The organization’s foundation was laid by the Young Patriots Movement, established in 1992 with the support of the Ministry of Defense. It brought together the remnants of Soviet-era military-patriotic clubs and games such as Zarnitsa, Orlyonok, and Gaidarovets. Initially, this movement remained marginal and lacked national visibility. By contrast, Yunarmiya, backed by significant funding, high-level political support, and extensive media coverage, began expanding rapidly. By early 2017, it had around 70,000 members and headquarters in every region of the Russian Federation. By May 2019, membership had surged to 500,000. In 2021, as spending on patriotic programming increased, enrollment exceeded 1 million, out of 17 million school-aged children nationwide. By the third year of the full-scale war, in March 2025, the number had grown to 1.8 million.

According to the Chief of General Staff of the Yunarmiya, Vyacheslav Golovin, among them are “12,000 participants in special military operations.” The statement is both alarming and perplexing: members of a youth organization reportedly taking part in war. But the explanation lies in the organization’s structure. According to its charter, membership is open to those aged 11 to 18, yet more than 400,000 Yunarmiya members are designated as “graduates and mentors,” including 122,000 who have gone on to careers in the military or law enforcement. The organization already maintains its own Memory Alley commemorating four young graduates who have died in combat.

The organization’s slick, and at times cartoonish, website makes no mention of trench warfare, deadly assaults, or the harsh realities of combat. Its stated objectives are framed in positive terms: to foster social, moral, intellectual, and physical development. To encourage kindness, conscientiousness, and compassion. And to promote “the development of civil society through the implementation of socially significant projects.” References to military training and service are relatively limited.

But that does not mean the organization’s purpose is obscured. Yunarmiya is clearly intended to cultivate not just soldiers-in-waiting but citizens deeply loyal to the military and its objectives. The organization mirrors a military hierarchy, complete with regional branches and a central headquarters housed in the Officers' House of the Moscow Military District. Children wear bright, stylized uniforms and take an oath. The organization’s anthem makes its mission unmistakably clear:

The regiments march in formation, keeping beautiful order,
And the banners rustle proudly

…

Russian troops march shoulder to shoulder,
And even though the military road is not easy,
We will serve Russia with faith and truth.

Once in Yunarmiya, a child is enrolled in one of the detachments at a school or military-patriotic club. A “mentor” heads each unit. They are usually an active-duty or retired service member or an employee of the security services or the Ministry of Emergency Situations. The child takes a ceremonial oath “to be loyal to their Fatherland and the Yunarmiya brotherhood.” In December 2021, the ceremony marking the organization’s millionth member was held at the Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces in Patriot Park and attended by Deputy Minister of Defense Gennady Zhidko. During the event, a massive Yunarmiya flag, measuring 30 by 20 meters, was unfurled, and a battery of three artillery guns fired five celebratory salutes.

Daily activities for school children vary by unit specialization. But many revolve around drill training, basic military and medical skills, athletics, and lessons on the Great Patriotic War.

Yunarmiya organizes a wide array of large-scale patriotic events, competitions, and military sports games. Many of these activities are held at venues operated by the Ministry of Defense. In 2021, the Ministry opened the Avangard Center in Patriot Park near Moscow to specifically provide high schoolers military training . Spanning 33 hectares, the center accommodates more than 80,000 cadets annually (up to 800 students at a time). Parents can purchase admission for their children, choosing from five- or ten-day training camps, including courses such as “Young Soldier,” UAV (drone) operation, and others. The center also hosts large forums and gatherings of the Yunarmiya youth organization to offer specialized programs in military and technical training. Similar centers have already opened or are under construction in cities across Russia. In June 2023, the Ministry of Defense announced plans to build military-patriotic education centers in all towns with populations over 50,000. At the time of the announcement, such centers were already operational in 104 cities, 37 of which had populations exceeding 100,000.

The famed Soviet-era children’s camps Artek and Orlyonok also host special “Yunarmiya shifts.”  These are sessions members can attend through a competitive application process requiring the completion of a task and submission of a personal portfolio. At these camps, basic military training is mandatory for children aged 12 to 16. Some sessions are explicitly geared toward military career preparation for high school students, along with other patriotic and physical development programs.

Attacks from Both Land and Water

Alongside Yunarmiya, a project called Zarnitsa 2.0 was launched in 2016. It’s a modernized version of the Soviet-era military game that features a digital aesthetic reminiscent of the StarCraft video game universe and updated to reflect current military training goals. The game is open to children aged eight and up. The kids are divided into teams of ten. Each team member selects a role: commander, war correspondent, sapper, medic, UAV operator, political instructor, or assault trooper. Participants are expected to study their specialty and acquire additional skills. Teams compete in multiple rounds, advancing from local and municipal qualifiers to the national finals. Challenges and tasks, especially for older participants, include a wide range of military and survival skills: combat relay races, general military literacy, drill training, Russian statehood and military history, tactical medicine, firearms training, chemical and biological defense, survival techniques, engineering and camouflage, tactical operations, and mock specialty tasks modeled on real military roles.

In 2024, Sergei Kirienko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, described his impressions of the final stage of Zarnitsa 2.0: “The commanders spoke with admiration about how well-equipped the teams were — on par with the best special forces. The kids used UAV reconnaissance, FPV kamikaze drones, ground-based drones, the latest surveillance gear. We saw them practicing attacks from both land and water — mine laying, demining, topography, tactical medicine.” Notably, participants in the war against Ukraine serve as mentors and experts throughout the game’s various stages.

Initially held in only a few regions, Zarnitsa 2.0 quickly expanded with support from the Ministry of Defense and federal funding. The game soon gained a formal structure, standardized rules, and a solid material base. Today, it is organized by the First Movement, another patriotic organization launched in Putin’s “new Russia”, with support from Yunarmiya and the Voin Center for Military-Patriotic Education. According to Kirienko, the game reached near-national scale in 2024: roughly 9,000 school and 4,000 city-level qualifying rounds were held, involving over 800,000 students. 

By spring 2025, the number of participants had surged. Organizers reported more than 3 million schoolchildren taking part in the qualifying rounds. In some regions, participation skyrocketed: fourfold in Dagestan and tenfold in Kaluga Region compared to previous years.

Cadet Corps

Another telling sign of the militarization of education in Russia is the rapid growth of cadet and Cossack  school programs explicitly designed to train future soldiers. Cadet education supplements the standard curriculum with systematic instruction in basic military skills, discipline, and routine. There are three primary types of cadet institutions: cadet corps (boarding schools with a closed structure), standalone cadet schools, and cadet classes within regular public schools. These institutions typically operate under agreements with the Ministry of Defense and prepare students for enrollment in military universities.

Cadet corps were originally founded as elite institutions in Tsarist Russia under Peter the Great but were abolished after the 1917 revolution. They were reintroduced under Stalin at the end of World War II, formally on the initiative of Lieutenant General A.A. Ignatiev, a former Tsarist officer and graduate of a pre-revolutionary cadet corps. These became known as the Suvorov and Nakhimov schools. By 1991, there were 11 such institutions across the USSR, along with several others that shared their goals and structure.

In the early 1990s, some of these schools closed, but new ones gradually emerged—often established by local authorities, retired or active military officers, and members of the security services. By the end of the 1990s, their number had grown to 40. At the same time, cadet schools and cadet classes began appearing in mainstream public schools—a model that had not existed in the Soviet Union. These students also wear uniforms, follow strict discipline, and participate in military drills after completing their standard academic classes. A school day for a cadet class student typically starts with roll call at 8:00 a.m. and ends at 6:00 p.m. Classes are organized into “platoons,” further divided into “sections” led by “commanders.” Afternoons include lessons with a military instructor on history and armed service, as well as training in drill and marksmanship. Students also join clubs focused on military and civic subjects. Patriotic exhibitions, field trips, military balls, and parades are common. In addition to a homeroom teacher, each class usually has a military-affiliated curator.

Under President Vladimir Putin, cadet education began expanding rapidly well before the formal funding of large-scale patriotic programming. By 2009, Russia had more than 120 cadet corps and schools. By the end of 2018, there were approximately 200 (serving 50,000 students) and more than 7,000 cadet classes (150,000 students) across the country. A major milestone came in 2014, when 72 cadet classes opened in 21 schools enrolling 1,600 students in Moscow alone. Each security and law enforcement agency now maintains its own network of affiliated institutions: the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have the largest reach, but even the Federal Penitentiary Service sponsors dozens of classes across the country.

Institutions for girls have also been created. The Ministry of Defense has operated  the Boarding School for the Daughters of Military Personnel since 2008. This elite school accepts girls, mainly daughters of military families, after a rigorous selection process. Their daily lives mirror those of students at the Suvorov Military School, including uniforms, regimented schedules, and limited military training. However, more emphasis is placed on cultivating traditional notions of femininity: the curriculum includes horseback riding, dance, and singing.

Since 2015, an annual cadet parade has been held in Moscow. In May 2025, 3,000 schoolchildren in cadet uniforms marched on Poklonnaya Hill, where they were addressed by Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, Patriarch Kirill, and Minister of Education Sergei Kravtsov. After the parade, a large public festival took place that featured  military-themed tents and interactive exhibits. 

As of 2025, there are cadet classes with 30,000 children enrolled in 236 schools in Moscow. Nationwide, approximately 510,000 students attend cadet and Cossack classes. For example, according to the authorities, in the 2024-2025 academic year, more than 100,000 children in the Kuban region alone were enrolled in Cossack classesoffered at 93 schools and 67 kindergartens. The Novosibirsk regional government reported that the number of cadet classes had doubled from 58 to 116, while the number of students had increased from 1,466 to 2,440.

What Unites Us All

Cadet corps and classes, youth military-patriotic organizations, military sports games, and competitions — all were carefully planned and developed long before the full-scale war in Ukraine. The rapid increase in participation and the qualitative expansion over the past three years have been driven not only by significant financial investments but also by the existence of a long-established infrastructure. It is worth noting that while these programs now play an increasingly prominent role in the lives of Russian schoolchildren, participation remains, at least formally, voluntary.

Since September 2022, however, school life has changed for all children in Russia. Every Monday now begins with a formal flag-raising ceremony. Following that, students across all grade levels attend a special patriotic class, “Conversations About Important Things”, led by their homeroom teachers.

In April 2022, during a patriotic youth forum titled “Strength in Truth”, Education Minister Sergei Kravtsov declared, “The government will not leave schoolchildren alone in the information war.” That same day, he announced the introduction of weekly patriotic lessons starting in the upcoming school year. President Vladimir Putin himself announced the winners of academic competitions and contests at the inaugural Conversation About Important Things. Putin repeated well-worn state narratives about protecting the people of Donbas and combating “Ukrainian Nazism” to underscore the political significance of the new curriculum.

The first batch of teaching materials, released in late summer 2022, sparked immediate concern among parents and educators. The content framed patriotism in simplistic and militarized terms. Children were encouraged to openly discuss the “special military operation,” the “reunification with Crimea,” the “collective West,” and “Ukrainian Nazism.” The messaging repeatedly linked love for nature and homeland with a willingness to serve — and, if necessary, die — for the Fatherland. The messaging’s bluntness shocked many teachers and parents. Online platforms were soon filled with reports of educators aggressively enforcing the scripted content.

In response to the backlash, the government revised the materials by September 12, removing direct references to the war and to dying for one’s country. Since February 20, 2023, a televised version of “Conversations About Important Things” has been aired during the Good Morning program on Channel One. President Putin recently suggested expanding the lessons to include kindergartens.

For this initiative, the Russian government has accomplished something unprecedented in the history of its education system: it has created a visually appealing and user-friendly website dedicated to the patriotic curriculum. All teaching materials — lesson plans, instructor guides, videos, slide decks, posters, and interactive tools — are professionally packaged, free of the bureaucratic sloppiness typically associated with state-produced content. Videos feature professional actors and celebrities, and lesson plans sometimes offer optional variations. For grades 10–11, teachers can choose to use or omit materials from Besogon TV, a propaganda channel hosted by aging filmmaker Nikita Mikhalkov, whose views are notoriously conservative and patriarchal. His segments are presented as thought-provoking material for students.

The curriculum for March 8 (International Women’s Day) promotes the message that women’s struggles are largely a thing of the past, and that the holiday now celebrates “true femininity,” defined as tenderness, care, attentiveness, and kindness. Stories of prominent women focus not on activism or rights, but on the centrality of family and traditional values in their lives. Teachers are encouraged to cite relevant statements by President Putin.

For example, on May 19, a lesson titled “The Values That Unite Us” was delivered nationwide. First- and second-grade students learned about the core traditional values that supposedly bind them together: patriotism (“love for the Motherland and readiness to defend it”), family, labor, and community. Older students in grades 10–11 recieved a more elaborate list of 17 traditional values said to unite all peoples of Russia, values that, according to the lesson, found their fullest expression in the victory of 1945. These include unity in the face of an enemy, strong families, a reliable support base, and collectivism. One video recommended for classroom use features Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of the state-run propaganda network RT (Russia Today).

The Struggle for the Future

Russia’s war against Ukraine has proven neither swift nor triumphant. For critics of the invasion, the persistence of anti-war sentiment among young people, even in state-aligned polls, has been a source of cautious optimism. After all, the future belongs to the youth. It is hardly surprising, then, that as the Kremlin began preparing for a prolonged conflict, it dramatically increased spending on patriotic indoctrination, placing renewed emphasis on influencing children through schools and mass youth organizations. Today, school life in Russia includes not only “Conversations About Important Things”, weekly flag-raising assemblies, and an expanding network of cadet classes, but also war memorial plaques and “hero desks” honoring graduates killed in Ukraine. Military-patriotic content is seeping into virtually every subject area. Youth organizations, buoyed by generous state funding, are growing in size and frequency of events, becoming reliable pathways for postwar employment, and in some cases, social mobility, for returning soldiers.

Yunarmiya, the state’s flagship youth military organization, is now headed by Colonel Vyacheslav Golovin. A marine special forces officer known by the call sign “Struna,” Golovin played a key role in the siege of Mariupol. The First Movement, another state-aligned youth group, is led by Major Artur Orlov, a veteran of both Syria and Ukraine. Increasingly, veterans of the Ukrainian invasion are being placed in leadership roles within youth programs or appointed to positions overseeing military-patriotic education in public schools.

The state is now openly striving to reach every Russian child. Not necessarily to turn each one into a soldier or a “true” patriot, but to at least to impose a singular worldview. In this narrative, the wise and benevolent President Putin speaks only the truth, Russia is perpetually surrounded by enemies, and the war in Ukraine is a just and necessary fight against Nazism like it was 80 years ago. In this imagined reality, war is not an aberration but norm. Russia has always fought and always prevailed with mercy and moral superiority. To love the homeland, the message goes, is to be ready to sacrifice for it.

This worldview is deeply dissonant, even schizophrenic. It is propagated systematically, through classroom instruction, extracurricular activities, children's television programs, and online media. Several million children are now involved in some aspect of military training, whether through the role-playing games of Yunarmiya or more intensive programs in cadet classes and schools. The scope, ambition, and coordination of the entire system are staggering and chilling. Perhaps most disturbing is the cynicism with which militaristic values are presented to children as civic virtue.

To be sure, not every school enforces this agenda with equal zeal. Much depends on the convictions of individual teachers and administrators. While participation in “Conversations About Important Things” is mandatory, the tone and substance of those conversations can vary. Many educators quietly continue to promote genuine humanistic and peaceful values and navigate the fine line between personal ethics and state expectations. In some underfunded schools, patriotic programming and cadet classes are little more than a way to meet quotas and fulfill official plans on paper.

And then there is the fundamental dissonance: the mythology pushed by state propaganda often clashes with the reality children observe in their everyday lives. At home, many are exposed to entirely different conversations —  about peace, freedom, and democracy. These values remain visible in Russian society despite years of repression, assaults on democratic institutions, censorship, and economic hardship. According to a recent Levada Center poll published in May, more than 60% of Russians said they support peace, and 15% openly declared they did not support the Russian army’s actions.

In light of this, there is little reason to believe that Russian children will passively absorb the state’s militarized messaging. The struggle for the future is far from over, and children, as always, may be more perceptive than they are given credit for.

‍