Migrant Women and the War: New Discriminatory Laws

Women make up at least a quarter of all labor migrants who come to Russia each year, totaling roughly one million people. Amid a growing anti-migrant campaign following the invasion, the number of female migrants has increased. Many women now travel to Russia to work instead of men, who are at risk of conscription. Some come with their families, while others travel alone, leaving their children behind. However, new migration laws have made both groups even more vulnerable.

Why are More and More Migrants Women?

Yulia Florinskaya, PhD in Geography, notes that the exact number of female migrants arriving in Russia each year is unknown, but conservative estimates suggest that it exceeds one million.

Interestingly, women from Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan are more likely to migrate to Russia than men from these countries. Nevertheless, they account for only a small proportion of the massive influx of labor migrants compared to those coming from Central Asia. According to data from Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1,586 women and 48 men arrived from Thailand in 2019. By contrast, nearly 134,000 women and 984,800 men from Uzbekistan obtained work permits in Russia that same year.

However, these figures are likely to be an underestimation. Official statistics often fail to accurately reflect women’s migration globally because much of their work takes place in the informal sector. In 2019, for instance, 82% of work permits issued to women in Russia were granted to female workers from Central Asia. By contrast, Ukrainian and Moldovan women accounted for no more than 15% of work permits issued.

Furthermore, many women from Central Asian countries, particularly Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, work in Russia without legal employment status. Often, they lack formal contracts and receive wages “off the books.” In reality, the number of women migrating from these countries is likely higher than the numbers official statistics suggest. Florinskaya based her estimates on multiple sources, including open data from the Federal State Statistics Service of Russia (Rosstat) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as sociological surveys that only account for legal migrants. According to the latest figures from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, at least 220,000 women and children may currently be residing in Russia without legal status.

Over the past two years, there has been an increasing “feminization” of migration flows from Central Asia. A 2025 World Bank study found that fewer men from Kyrgyzstan are traveling to Russia for work, while the number of women doing so continues to grow.

The feminization of migration is a global trend that has been emerging for years. According to 2017 data from the International Labour Organization (ILO), around 42% of all migrants worldwide — approximately 68.1 million people — are women. This shift is closely linked to structural changes in the global economy. While the manufacturing sector is shrinking, the service sector continues to grow. This sector employs the majority of labor migrants in Russia.

A survey conducted by the Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2017 revealed that the majority of male and female migrants in Russia worked in the following sectors: trade (49% of men and 27% of women), services (14% of both genders), hospitality and catering (11% of women), and construction (approximately 25% of male migrants).

In Russia's case, the feminization of migration reflects not only the global trend but also a specifically Russian context. Foreign workers are simply afraid to go to work in a country where they could be forced to sign a contract and be sent to war if they try to obtain a residence permit or are found to lack the correct documentation. Meanwhile, labor demand in Russia remains high, and women from Kyrgyzstan are responding to this. Traditionally, up to 90% of migrants from Kazakhstan come to Russia.

All of these points lead to one conclusion: Russia’s new migration laws primarily affect migrant workers, both men and women, from Central Asia.

What Risks Do Migrant Women Face under the New Laws?

Now, let’s look at some examples. A 2022 study found that the majority of foreign female workers are employed in wholesale and retail trade and repair (48.9%), community and social services (14%), and hospitality (11.2%). Among women from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 71% of respondents said they found work through personal networks. Consequently, more than half of these women work without official labor contracts, which renders their employment illegal and leaves them in an extremely vulnerable position with little to no legal protection. This occurs at the initiative of employers and, sometimes, at the women’s own choice.

There is also a vicious cycle within the employment system: many women cannot afford an official work permit due to low wages. However, if they are stopped by the police, they face a high risk of being sent to immigration detention centers and later deported, sometimes alongside their children.

As a result, many Central Asian migrant women now live in isolation and fear. According to media reports, some try to leave their homes as infrequently as possible to avoid attracting police attention. This directly impacts their income, but at least they still have a job. For many, this is better than losing it altogether.

Some come under the scrutiny of so-called “community” groups, the police, and local officials who are keen to demonstrate their efforts to combat illegal migration by organizing raids on markets, including informal ones.

For example, nine people selling fruit and vegetables were arrested during a raid on a market in Yekaterinburg in 2024. Such operations are not new, but this time, members of the pro-Kremlin, anti-migrant movement, the Russian Community (Russkaya Obshchina) movement, joined the police and local administration in the raid. Wearing masks and camouflage uniforms, the group threatened the vendors with rubber batons and then told passers-by to take the produce belonging to those who had been detained. According to local residents, the owner of the goods had fled “because he didn't want to join the army.”

According to Meduza Media, Russkaya Obshchina has close ties with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and occasionally carries out its assignments. However, migrants are also threatened by unsanctioned raids. For example, in June 2025, two armed men attacked a market in the Moscow region where Azerbaijani traders worked. This incident coincided with a broader anti-Azerbaijani campaign in Russia. Overall, the number of far-right and neo-Nazi groups in the country is growing, and migrants are among their primary targets. According to data from the SOVA Center, of the 221 hate crimes recorded in 2025, 16 were committed against individuals categorized as racially or ethnically “different.” The largest group of victims, totaling 92 people, was classified as “non-Slavs,” including 16 individuals from Central Asia.

Since September 1, 2025, certain foreign nationals have been required to share their geolocation data with the Ministry of Internal Affairs via a mobile app called Amina. This rule applies, namely, to citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. In practice, this means that women working without a legal permit may now face additional sanctions for failing to report their real-time location to the authorities.

Another factor that increases women’s vulnerability is the ban on employment in certain sectors. Since 2024, regional governments have been allowed to prevent migrant workers with labor permits from working in certain industries within their territories. According to State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, migrants who do not speak Russian should not be allowed to work in taxi services or hospitals. He claims that regulating labor migration at the regional level will enable “finer legislative adjustments” tailored to local economic needs.

According to estimates by Verstka Media, 49 regions introduced such bans last year. Several regions went further in 2025, prohibiting labor migrants with work permits from working in the taxi industry. However, these restrictions did not extend to the construction sector, which is considered a development priority in some regions and employs up to half of all male labor migrants in Russia. This was the case in the Republic of Tatarstan, for instance. In other words, such discriminatory practices tend to reflect the interests of those lobbying for specific bans.

These employment restrictions apply only to foreign nationals with work permits, which are typically obtained by citizens of countries with visa-free entry to Russia, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Consequently, women from Central Asia are becoming increasingly economically vulnerable, particularly those whose spouses, partners, or relatives are subject to these hiring bans. Labor migration income accounts for up to half of many families’ total earnings, and up to 30% of migrant women move to Russia with their families.

The new bans have forced families to seek alternative sources of income, often pushing them into the shadow labor market, where they risk encountering documentation issues. This threatens the stability and future prospects of entire households.

How will Women Be Affected by Restrictions on Children's Access to Education? 

Russian authorities have increasingly focused on labor migrants who arrive with their families. According to official data, one in five foreign workers in Russia lives with family members. Between 40% and 45% of all labor migrants had minor children under 16 living with them in the early 2010s. However, in mid-September 2025, Maxim Reshetnikov, Russia’s Minister of Economic Development, announced that the country was shifting towards a “circular migration” model. He explained, “Come, work for some time, then leave.” 

“In other words, we don't really need those families here. Nor are we obliged to educate non-citizens,” the minister added.

A month earlier, Sergey Mironov, the leader of the A Just Russia – For Truth party, had expressed a similar opinion. He argued that if labor migrants came to Russia without their children, it would solve the overcrowding problem in kindergartens and schools. He claimed that migrant children were filling these facilities. Mironov added that many migrants do not intend to work in Russia but still enroll their children in state schools.

The justification for restricting children with a migration background from accessing education is their insufficient command of the state language. In December 2024, the State Duma passed a bill in its first reading prohibiting schools from admitting children who do not speak Russian. According to Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, this issue affects 41% of migrant children. However, a 2015 study found that two-thirds of migrants employed in Russian households speak Russian as their native language, with an additional 45% speaking it fluently.

From 2025 onwards, foreign minors will be required to pass an 80-minute Russian language exam, comprising a written and an oral section, in order to enroll at school. First-grade applicants are only required to take the oral part of the exam. In September, the Federal Service for the Supervision of Education and Science (Rosobrnadzor) released the first results of the testing introduced on April 1, 2025. The results showed that only 49.9% of the participants passed (2,964 out of 5,940 children). Those who did not pass will be allowed to retake the exam in three months. 

However, of those who wished to participate, only a fraction — nearly 6,000 children — actually took the exam. According to Rosobrnadzor, only one-third of applicants were admitted to the language test between April and August 2025 — 8,200 out of 23,600 children. The rest were rejected for lacking the necessary documentation, including proof of legal residence for both the child and their parents.

For years, migrant families in Russia have been denied school enrollment due to missing residence registration papers or medical certificates. Now, the introduction of a Russian language exam has created another barrier and become a tool for discriminating against an already marginalized group. School administrators have refused to enroll children with a migration background simply because they did not pass the exam, even when Russian is their native language. In the city of Tyumen, for example, a girl from a Russian-speaking Kazakh family was denied enrollment despite earning 18 out of 20 points on the written exam.

By law, children can retake the Russian language exam after three months. During this period, they can attend state-run language courses, which are intended to be free. However, the delay in the start of the school year poses additional challenges for families, especially mothers, who have to reorganize their daily lives around the new requirements. This situation makes them even more vulnerable and can negatively affect the child’s self-esteem and integration into society.

In October 2025, a proposal was introduced to the State Duma to exempt certain categories of foreign children from the language test required for school admission. The exemption would apply to participants in the state resettlement program for compatriots, citizens of countries where Russian is an official language, and the children of diplomats and employees of international organizations. In other words, the new regulation would not affect Central Asian migrants, who make up the majority of migrants in Russia. 

Read Posle.Media’s report here to find out more about how the new xenophobic laws in Russia are discriminating against children from migrant backgrounds.

Is It Worth Coming Back?

The State Duma is now considering the next step of introducing fully paid education for the children of foreign citizens. If adopted, the law would mean that preschool, elementary school, and secondary vocational education would be entirely commercial for this group. It would also limit the number of free attempts to pass the mandatory Russian language test to three.

Yaroslav Nilov, one of the bill’s sponsors, claims that Russian taxpayers should not be responsible for these costs, but rather “the migrant's family, employer, embassy, charitable foundations, or the foreign state of which the migrant is a citizen.” Nilov presents his proposal as a gesture of concern for migrant children. He argues that if they cannot learn Russian, they “shouldn’t have to struggle” and could instead start their education at Russian-language schools in their home countries or via online courses there.

In practice, however, families who return home because their children cannot enroll in Russian schools often encounter severe shortages of school places in their countries of origin. Zhanar Akayev, a Kyrgyz MP, reported that classrooms in the capital, Bishkek, and the second-largest city, Osh, now accommodate between 40 and 60 pupils. This situation is partly due to the return of labor migrants from Russia. Akayev has urged the Kyrgyz government to negotiate with the Russian authorities to resolve the issue, arguing that the right to education of Kyrgyz children is being violated in Russia. Meanwhile, parents have appealed to the Kyrgyz government to provide online classes for their children.

In other words, returning home does not guarantee migrant children access to education. For mothers hoping to find work in Russia, this often means leaving their children with relatives. This situation is similar to that experienced by many Georgian migrant women, who were forced to leave their children at home in order to find employment abroad. Many now watch their children grow up via video call; few can afford to save enough for a short visit home.

The vulnerabilities experienced by migrant women working abroad exist at the intersection of several factors, including gender, socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, religion, and motherhood. The more of these factors that overlap, the more vulnerable they are. The challenges faced by labor migrants in Russia have only worsened amid the social and political upheavals since February 24, 2022. When navigating these hardships, migrant women often have no one to rely on but themselves and a few NGOs, which the Russian state tends to view with suspicion.

In this environment, horizontal networks, solidarity, and grassroots initiatives are essential. These networks are often most effective when they remain invisible within the public sphere. We can support these networks by safely documenting and recording what is happening so that when the time is right, we can give Central Asian migrant women a voice and enable them to tell their stories, which are currently being silenced for various reasons.

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