On the Edge of the World. Javier Milei’s Argentina, Two Years After

A (well-placed) mole inside the State

The current president of Argentina, Javier Milei, is an economist who defines himself as an “anarcho-capitalist” and a “libertarian”. Through his regular appearances on TV shows — full of shouting and political incorrectness — he managed to capitalize on the population’s accumulated discontent after a succession of center-right governments and reached the presidency of the country at the end of 2023. An unprecedented case in Argentina’s history, the loco [“madman”] made the phrase “a mole that comes to destroy the State from within” the cornerstone of his ideology. However, after two years in office, he has demonstrated a remarkable ability to accommodate himself within that which he supposedly came to annihilate.

In a short time, he abandoned the most radical election campaign promises, such as closing the Central Bank or dollarizing the economy, in order to impose a more pragmatic and orthodox neoliberal economic program. Milei adapted his agenda to the demands of a ruling class that benefits from a new transfer of resources already tested in previous periods, such as under the governments of Carlos Menem (1989–1999) and Mauricio Macri (2015–2019). In fact, several of Milei’s collaborators were part of those experiences, such as Guillermo Francos — who served as chief of staff until 2025 — Luis Caputo — current Minister of Economy — or Federico Sturzenegger — in charge of the Ministry of Deregulation and State Transformation. The combination of drastic fiscal adjustment, cuts in public spending, economic deregulation, a cheap dollar, and openness to imports are some of the features that characterize his administration during these two years. The results are already becoming visible.

Although Milei has managed to tame the risk of hyperinflation — a specter deeply embedded in the imagination of all Argentines — his economic program is wreaking havoc on the already weakened national industry and is contributing to job losses. Its effects are also felt in a reduction in the purchasing power of the majority of the population and a noticeable decline in consumption. Despite this, the government has not yet faced strong political challenges, due to a divided and weakened opposition and a population still fearful that what little it has could collapse overnight. Moreover, Milei has been effective in imposing a certain social order in the streets, and his rhetoric continues to blame all of the country’s problems on the legacy of Peronist governments — a discourse that often reaches irrational levels but resonates within broad segments of the population.

Indeed, if anything characterizes Milei’s political style, are their personalistic and aggressive traits, and a dismissive attitude toward democratic practices, favoring the enactment of decrees and the disregard of laws passed by the national Congress. The president often uses insult and intimidation as everyday tools of governance. He prefers to display his aggressiveness and vulgarity through his account on the social network X rather than through oral interventions, for which he has shown a notable deficiency. Among his enemies are not only prominent figures of Peronism — such as former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, currently imprisoned, or Axel Kicillof, governor of the country’s most important province — but also critical economists and journalists. Regarding the latter, Milei has stated recently that “95 % of Argentine journalists are criminals or are financed by other countries.” In fact, last month — drawing on longstanding prejudices about communism present in much of the population — the government promoted a version claiming that the Kremlin had financed a disinformation operation to weaken Milei, which in practice led to the cancellation of journalists and media outlets who were allegedly involved.

Although he still enjoys a free hand, the government has committed several unforced errors that have exposed inconsistencies in the libertarian project. These include the president himself, who in 2025 promoted on X a scam linked to the world of crypto, and other prominent figures in his administration such as the chief of staff and speaker —Manuel Adorni— who was involved in a case of illicit enrichment. These are sensitive issues for a political force that came to power promising to end the “privileges of the caste” and denouncing the “corruption of Peronism.” Although these events have not yet destroyed its political capital, they have revealed the government’s improvised and erratic nature.‍

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On the edge of the world

Undoubtedly, one of the most forceful and structural transformations of Javier Milei’s government has been the reconfiguration of the country’s international agenda, now closely aligned with the directives of the United States. Never in Argentina’s history — not even in the 1990s, when then —foreign minister Guido Di Tella described the relationship between Casa Rosada and Washington with the rather unfortunate metaphor of “carnal relations” — has an Argentine government subordinated its diplomacy so completely to the actions of the United States. In fact, Milei was the first president to visit Donald Trump after he assumed office.

Since the beginning of his administration, Milei has blindly followed resolutions proposed by the White House, even when those decisions forced him to get involved in external conflicts that could generate adverse effects for Argentina. For example, in April of this year the Argentine government declared the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as a “terrorist organization,” which earned it threats of future reprisals from the Iranian government. Argentines know that such an ultimatum can be real: everyone remembers the two terrorist attacks suffered by the country in 1992 and 1994 after President Carlos Menem sent troops to the Persian Gulf War. Moreover, the withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO), confirmed in March 2026, and the refusal to vote in the United Nations (UN) in favor of the declaration that considered slavery “the greatest crime against humanity” are among many cases in which Argentina chose to follow the United States blindly, against its own historical foreign policy. As it is known, the other two countries that voted against that measure were the United States and Israel. The situation is so extreme that any official who deviates from these directives risks being removed from government. Foreign Minister Diana Mondino, for example, had to resign in 2024 after voting — consistent with Argentina’s longstanding position, regardless of the ideology of its governments — against the embargo on Cuba. Times and methods have changed quickly.

This almost unconditional alignment can be explained by several factors. First, the strong ideological affinity between Javier Milei and Donald Trump. Milei sees in Trump a global leader capable of supporting his domestic agenda, including his critique of “woke” culture, the fight against any form of “communism”, the defense of private property, and the implementation of neoliberal economic measures, among others. In fact, Milei often argues that Argentina and the United States share a “cultural DNA,” whose core lies in their belonging to Western civilization. The Argentine president also tends to share with his U.S. counterpart a vision of their countries’ histories: a (mythical, in the case of Argentina) past of greatness that was derailed by populist governments and that now needs to be redirected toward that place from which it should never have strayed. Indeed, Milei adopted Trump’s slogan MAGA (“Make America Great Again”), adapting it to the local context (“Make Argentina Great Again”).

Second, Milei’s pro-U.S. orientation coincides with a shift in Trump’s policy toward Latin America. The White House has decided to revive the Monroe Doctrine established in 1823 by John Adams, Secretary of State under President James Monroe. This doctrine sought, unilaterally and in the context of Latin American independence struggles, to ward off the influence of extra-continental powers in the region, especially European ones. It was summarized in the slogan “America for the Americans,” implicitly recognizing the need for spheres of influence.

After a series of Democratic administrations (Barack Obama and Joe Biden) that explicitly attempted to soften this doctrine, Trump seeks to revive it in a context in which global relations seem to have moved away from international law and are being reconfigured according to a new model that places greater importance on the dominance that the most powerful countries can exert over their supposed areas of influence. It is the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, as the White House called the new U.S. National Security Doctrine without hesitation. In this endeavor, however, the United States does not appear to be alone, as recent global moves by Russia and China seem to follow similar principles, ushering in a new era in international relations.

In Latin America, Trump put this doctrine into practice with the invasion of Venezuela in January 2026 and the kidnapping of its president, Nicolás Maduro, to be tried in the United States. The U.S. president justified his initiative by citing the defense of human rights and democracy within Venezuela, as well as the need to combat the effects that drug trafficking would have on law and order and security in the United States, given that Nicolás Maduro is allegedly the leader of the Cartel de los Soles. However, a few days later, the U.S. president himself posted on the Truth Social platform stating that Venezuela would deliver between thirty and fifty million barrels of oil to the United States, the proceeds of which would be administered directly by him “for the benefit of the Venezuelan and American peoples.”

Among the next targets is Cuba — currently on hold due to the attempted operation in Iran — which Trump envisions, in the best-case scenario, governed by Marco Rubio, his current Secretary of State of Cuban origin. Thus, the “America’s backyard” would finally be cleared of “communists” and could once again be used by the United States according to geopolitical and economic considerations, especially those related to oil and other key resources such as rare-earth elements. Through these exemplary moves, and given the Argentine president’s explicit alignment with the “Western world”, Trump has found in Milei a strategic geopolitical ally who helps advance U.S. influence in the region with little resistance, with the ultimate goal of reconstituting its sphere of influence and slowing China’s growing presence, perceived by Washington as both a security threat and a dangerous economic competitor in the region. In that regard, we should not overlook Trump’s constant claims regarding Greenland, which is currently under European control but which, in his view, should belong to the United States.

Third, and related to the above, Milei appears to have found in Trump the political and financial backing that he struggles to obtain elsewhere. Trump’s open endorsement for Milei, expressed days before the 2025 parliamentary elections, was crucial in reversing what initially appeared to be a negative trend. Moreover, the U.S. government remains willing to guarantee the financial stability of a country constantly burdened by external debt responsibilities and a chronic shortage of dollars. Additionally, the United States offers the possibility of expanding investments through economic agreements, such as the one signed in February 2026, although in Argentina there are doubts about its benefits and criticisms of its extreme asymmetry.

Milei has also complemented this support with alignment in defense matters, not only through statements such as those directed against Iran but also through the purchase of 24 F-16 aircraft from Denmark, in a context where the government emphasizes fiscal austerity. This is already obsolete aeronautical technology but places Argentina under the military and technological orbit of the United States.

Milei’s foreign policy, subordinated to the United States, is complemented by unwavering support for decisions made by another key ally of that country: Israel. Milei defines himself as “the most pro-Zionist president in the world” and has not only supported attacks in Gaza and Iran but has also made powerful symbolic gestures, such as breaking down in tears at the Western Wall in Jerusalem just months after taking office. Moreover, at the beginning of his term he proposed moving the Argentine embassy to Jerusalem, a project he may soon announce in Israel during independence celebrations, to which he has been invited. If carried out, Argentina would join the very small group of countries that have already done so, alongside the United States. Behind these decisions lies not only geopolitical “Western” alignment but also ideological convergence within a broader global right-wing front, which includes figures such as Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as Viktor Orban in Hungary and the Bolsonaro family in Brazil, among others.

The counterpart of this alignment with the United States and Israel is the dismantling of longstanding alliances with other countries that had functioned as strategic partners, especially in trade, as they were labeled indiscriminately as “communist” and “anti-Western,” as in the case of Brazil and Venezuela in Latin America, and China in Southeast Asia. In fact, the Argentine government rejected the formal invitation to join BRICS starting January 1, 2024. With this move, Milei not only distanced himself from his domestic predecessors but also reinforced Argentina’s new global insertion under the aegis of the United States and away from historical allies such as Brazil.

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The battle against culture

One of the notable aspects of Milei’s government lies in its open rejection of scientific knowledge in particular and the field of cultural production in general. Moreover, among Milei’s supporters there seems to be a certain celebration of ignorance and magical thinking (the president himself often invokes “the forces of heaven” to support his decisions), along with a strong tendency to explain social processes through the lens of personal experience, emphasizing meritocracy. In an economy governed by the free play of supply and demand, libertarians argue, poverty is a choice rather than a consequence of systemic injustice. It is no coincidence that one of Milei’s role models is Elon Musk, who embodies this mix of inflexible defense of adventurous capitalism and political incorrectness.

This view aligns with the negative diagnosis that Milei applies to both culture and education. For him, these are spaces captured by cultural Marxism and therefore in need of eradication or at least profound transformation. Indeed, the Argentine president and his ideological allies often use the term “cultural battle” — even invoking Antonio Gramsci — to describe the tasks ahead. A government official in the province of Tucumán and director of the provincial public radio, for instance, openly referred to Mercedes Sosa — perhaps the most important figure in Argentine and Latin American folk music of the 20th century — as a “fat communist.” Feminism, the advance of “cultural Marxism,” concern about climate change and the environmental agenda, and the expansion of rights for sexual minorities are among the allegedly corrosive influences that should be reversed.

In practice, this stance translates into the defunding of major educational institutions, such as state universities — including the University of Buenos Aires, one of the most prestigious in Latin America— or even the closure of cultural institutions such as INCAA, the state institute that promoted national film production and was behind the country’s only two Academy Awards. At the same time, social media and traditional media are rife with attacks on artists, intellectuals, feminists, and social movement leaders. The president often insults and mocks his targets, as in the case of popular singer Lali Espósito — whom he renamed “Ladri Depósito”, a play on words in Spanish that could be translated into English as “thief who takes bribes” — or the Peronist governor of Buenos Aires Province, Axel Kicillof, whom he called “the communist dwarf” and frequently labels him as “Bolshevik” and “Soviet” to discredit him publicly.

Moreover, Milei’s government often adopts a stance that not only denies the crimes committed during the last military dictatorship (1976–1983) — which included torture, forced disappearances of persons, and the appropriation of babies — but also openly vindicates them, implicitly valuing both their political methods and their economic decisions, which marked the beginning of the dismantling of the country’s productive structure and the rise of a model based on financial capital. This year, on the 50th anniversary of the coup, the government released a video calling for a “complete truth,” seeking to equate guerrilla actions with state terror and minimizing the major achievements of human rights movements over recent decades. In contrast, there was a massive popular mobilization on the day of the anniversary, including thousands of young people who did not experience the dictatorship but took to the streets to demand truth, memory, and justice.

Meanwhile, the new Congress dominated by Milei’s forces has just approved a modification to the Glacier Law, which in practice opens the door to the outright plundering of such a sensitive natural resource as water, and allows broader environmental deregulation. In his cultural and ecological policies, Milei shows consistency with his economic measures and geopolitical orientation: the transformation of Argentina into a space of exploitation serving the interests of big capital and powerful countries. In this sense, the libertarian government aims to erode some of Argentina’s most valued assets, such as its relative social equality, free access to higher education, and the democratic pact.

This model is far from “making Argentina great again”. On the contrary, seems more likely to deepen the country’s long-standing decline, which began 50 years ago with the last military dictatorship. This coincidence is not an accident.